Quantcast World War II -Continued

Click Here to
Order this information in Print

Click Here to
Order this information on CD-ROM

Click Here to
Download this information in PDF Format

 

Click here to make tpub.com your Home Page

Page Title: World War II -Continued
Back | Up | Next

Click here for a printable version

Google


Web
www.tpub.com

Home

   
Information Categories
.... Administration
Advancement
Aerographer
Automotive
Aviation
Combat
Construction
Diving
Draftsman
Engineering
Electronics
Food and Cooking
Math
Medical
Music
Nuclear Fundamentals
Photography
Religion
USMC
   
Products
  Educational CD-ROM's
Printed Manuals
Downloadable Books

   


 

Share on Google+Share on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on TwitterShare on DiggShare on Stumble Upon
Back
World War I - 12966_14
Up
Naval Orientation - Military manual for administrative purposes
Next
Korean Confllict
Even so, had the Axis power correctly estimated the  strategic  importance  of  the  Mediterranean early  in  the  war,  it  could  have  concentrated  all possible naval resources in that area. Then with the Italian fleet as the main striking force and with other  military  forces  operating  in  support,  the Mediterranean might well have fallen under Axis power.  Under  such  circumstances  the  Allies’ African   campaign   would   have   faced   almost insurmountable   difficulties. England   held   an   uncertain   tenure   in   the Mediterranean  while  U.S.  forces  were  being assembled.  Later,  with  combined  strength, the  United  States  and  England  conducted  the great   amphibious   campaigns   against   North Africa,  Sicily,  Italy,  Normandy,  and  the  Med- iterranean  coast  of  France.  The  success  of  each of these campaigns was a stepping-stone to final victory. In the first years of the war, the United States’ range of operation was limited. As the Americans reduced  Japan’s  navy,  the  U.S.  Navy  grew, especially  in  the  area  of  naval  air  superiority.  The United  States  was  then  able  to  operate  more freely, to bypass enemy strongholds, and to omit many  grueling  campaigns. Sea   power   means   more   than   controlling the   sea   for   one’s   own   use;   it   also   means denying  its  use  to  the  enemy.  Therefore,  the United States also used naval blockades to deny Japan the use of the sea and eventually starve its economy. With  local  control  of  the  Pacific,  Japan  had been   able   to   capture   Singapore,   the   western Aleutians, the East Indies, the Solomons, and to threaten Australia. When Japan lost this control, it was unable to send men, supplies, and ships to the  aid  of  Okinawa,  the  threshold  of  its  home- land. Because  of  the  effects  of  sea  power,  United States landings in Leyte and Lingayen were ahead of  schedule.  In  addition,  the  blockades  pre- vented Japan from exploiting its strength in the Philippines and from satisfactorily reinforcing its troops  at  the  point  of  attack.  Control  of  the  sea enabled  United  States  forces  to  bypass  many islands  and  avoid  water  controlled  by  the enemy. Sea  power  permits  multiple  use  of  the  same force;  a  small  army  becomes  in  effect  many armies. This proved to be true as only a handful of U.S. forces in the Pacific drove steadily toward the Japanese home islands. In much of the central and  western  Pacific,  the  Japanese  had  a  strong numerical  superiority;  but  a  large  portion  of  its troops  never  entered  into  combat.  Without adequate  shipping  and  naval  air  power,  the Japanese   legions   were   helpless   against   the superiority of the few U.S. divisions that opposed them. As demonstrated against Germany and Japan during  World  War  II,  naval  blockades  have a  major  impact  on  the  outcome  of  war.  Further understanding  of  a  blockade’s  numbing  grip can   be   gained   from   figures   released   in   a report  from  General  MacArthur’s  headquarters in   Japan   following   World   War   II.   (General MacArthur  was  Commander  in  Chief,  Far  East Command.) This  report  showed  a  peak  wartime  production of  approximately  9,600,000  tons  of  steel  ingots in the Japanese Empire in 1943. By 1945 Japan’s steel industry was producing at the rate of only 120,000  tons  a  year.  The  report  indicated  that 1,800,000   tons   of   the   annual   capacity   was erased by bombing. The remaining 7,680,000-ton loss   in   production   was   the   result   of   naval blockades. Another  part  of  this  report  showed  further evidence  of  how  naval  blockades  helped  break down  Japan’s  economy.  In  1941  a  total  of 4,000,000   tons   of   iron   ore   was   required   by the   Japanese   steel   industry.   Of   this,   some 3,000,000  tons  had  to  be  imported  from  the Asiatic   mainland   and   from   the   Philippines. As  the  naval  blockade  tightened,  imports  dropped off; by 1944 the iron content of imported ore was less than 30 percent of the tonnage imported in 1941. In   common   with   those   of   other   nations, Japan’s  sea  and  air  fleets  were  entirely  dependent on petroleum for fuel. Japan imported nearly all of  its  petroleum  supply.  When  the  blockade applied  by  American  submarines  cut  this  vital supply  line  in  1944,  Japanese  naval  and  air  forces were  doomed  to  eventual  paralysis.  The  industrial deterioration  induced  in  Japan  by  the  blockade was  somewhat  slower  to  take  effect,  but  it  was equally fatal to the nation’s war effort. Industrial potential  is  essential  in  developing  sea  power; therefore,  the  destruction  of  an  enemy’s  industrial 1-7

Privacy Statement - Press Release - Copyright Information. - Contact Us - Support Integrated Publishing

Integrated Publishing, Inc.