attempts  to  sortie  (go  on  missions),  the  enemy units  are  destroyed.  Submarines  and  mines  are often  used  with  this  tactic. 2. CHOKEPOINT CONTROL is used to pre- vent the enemy from going through geographical bottlenecks.  The  enemy  must  concentrate  forces when at these points and is, therefore, vulnerable to  attack. 3.   OPEN   AREA   OPERATIONS   are   used when  the  tactics  above  do  not  work  or  if  the enemy is already underway at sea or in the air. Search and surveillance systems are used to locate and  track  the  enemy  before  attacks. 4.   LOCAL   ENGAGEMENT   is   the   final tactic.   This   tactic   involves   a   concentration   of forces in a limited area. These forces may attack and destroy any enemy when it enters the range of their weapons either before or after an attack. Historically,  the  Navy’s  radius  of  action  has been  limited  to  the  enemy’s  coastline,  plus  the range  of  the  ship’s  guns.  With  the  development of  high-performance  aircraft  and  ballistic  missiles, the Navy’s range of action now spans continents. Ships,   because   of   their   mobility,   are   less accessible  targets  than  shore  bases.  Furthermore, as a partial deterrent to the destructive capabilities of  nuclear  weapons,  the  dispersal  concept  has been  added  to  fleet  doctrine. Projection of Power Ashore This  functional  area  involves  the  impact  of naval  forces  on  land  forces.  Three  types  of actions   are   used   to   project   power   ashore: AMPHIBIOUS   ASSAULT,   NAVAL   BOM- BARDMENT,  and  TACTICAL  AIR  PROJEC- TION. Although amphibious assault and naval bom- bardment  are  probably  familiar  to  you,  tactical air projection may not be. Tactical air projection is  divided  into  four  categories: 1.   DEEP   INTERDICTION—This   tactic   in- volves carrier-based air attacks outside the battle area.  These  attacks  are  designed  to  destroy  or cripple  the  enemy’s  military  potential. 2.   BATTLEFIELD   INTERDICTION—This tactic involves carrier-based air attacks on military targets  of  immediate  importance.  These  attacks are   used   to   slow   the   enemy’s   movement   of supplies  and  reinforcements. 3.  CLOSE  AIR  SUPPORT—This  tactic provides  direct  support  to  front-line  ground troops by specially trained Marine Corps air units. It usually involves precision attacks on targets just ahead  of  the  front-line  troops. 4.  COUNTER  AIR/ANTIAIR  WARFARE— This  tactic  is  designed  to  keep  the  enemy  from using aircraft or missiles to attack our forces or defend the enemy’s forces. It involves attacks on enemy aircraft, missile installations, and air fields. Naval  Presence Naval presence is the use of naval forces for political   objectives   without   war.   Generally,   it consists  of  PREVENTIVE  DEPLOYMENTS  and RESPONSIVE    DEPLOYMENTS. Preventive  deployments  are  a  show  of  force during peacetime to indicate the capability of the Navy’s  forces.  Responsive  deployments  are  an indication of the response of the Navy to a crisis situation. In either case, the presence of the Navy is a threat of action. This threat does not have to be spoken. Hopefully, the mere presence of the Navy will be enough to cause the problem to disappear. United States forces can use these deployments to  reassure  allies  and  deter  possible  aggression from  potential  enemies. All of these tactics are designed to accomplish the  mission  of  the  Navy—preparedness  to  con- duct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea. THE  SOVIET  THREAT Before a nation can make any strategic plans for the employment of its forces, it must consider who or what its threat or opponent might be. It can then analyze the opponent or threat and make plans  to  counter  any  opposition  that  arises.  For the  United  States,  the  Soviet  Union  and  the Warsaw  Pact  nations  are  considered  to  be  a threat. SOVIET  MILITARY  THREAT The Communist party of the Soviet Union is concerned  with  the  nature  of  a  possible  future war.  The  military  doctrine  of  the  Soviet  Union is to prepare the country and its armed forces for conducting such a war. The Soviets view war as an extension of politics and therefore emphasize offensive  operations.  A  Soviet  victory  in  either a  conventional  or  nuclear  war  would  neutralize the influence of NATO on world politics. It would also end the political structure of the United States as  we  know  it  today. 1-14