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Even so, had the Axis power correctly estimated
the strategic importance of the Mediterranean
early in the war, it could have concentrated all
possible naval resources in that area. Then with
the Italian fleet as the main striking force and with
other military forces operating in support, the
Mediterranean might well have fallen under Axis
power. Under such circumstances the Allies’
African campaign would have faced almost
insurmountable difficulties.
England held an uncertain tenure in the
Mediterranean while U.S. forces were being
assembled. Later, with combined strength,
the United States and England conducted the
great amphibious campaigns against North
Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, and the Med-
iterranean coast of France. The success of each
of these campaigns was a stepping-stone to final
victory.
In the first years of the war, the United States’
range of operation was limited. As the Americans
reduced Japan’s navy, the U.S. Navy grew,
especially in the area of naval air superiority. The
United States was then able to operate more
freely, to bypass enemy strongholds, and to omit
many grueling campaigns.
Sea power means more than controlling
the sea for one’s own use; it also means
denying its use to the enemy. Therefore, the
United States also used naval blockades to deny
Japan the use of the sea and eventually starve its
economy.
With local control of the Pacific, Japan had
been able to capture Singapore, the western
Aleutians, the East Indies, the Solomons, and to
threaten Australia. When Japan lost this control,
it was unable to send men, supplies, and ships to
the aid of Okinawa, the threshold of its home-
land.
Because of the effects of sea power, United
States landings in Leyte and Lingayen were ahead
of schedule. In addition, the blockades pre-
vented Japan from exploiting its strength in the
Philippines and from satisfactorily reinforcing its
troops at the point of attack. Control of the sea
enabled United States forces to bypass many
islands and avoid water controlled by the
enemy.
Sea power permits multiple use of the same
force; a small army becomes in effect many
armies. This proved to be true as only a handful
of U.S. forces in the Pacific drove steadily toward
the Japanese home islands. In much of the central
and western Pacific, the Japanese had a strong
numerical superiority; but a large portion of its
troops never entered into combat. Without
adequate shipping and naval air power, the
Japanese legions were helpless against the
superiority of the few U.S. divisions that opposed
them.
As demonstrated against Germany and Japan
during World War II, naval blockades have
a major impact on the outcome of war. Further
understanding of a blockade’s numbing grip
can be gained from figures released in a
report from General MacArthur’s headquarters
in Japan following World War II. (General
MacArthur was Commander in Chief, Far East
Command.)
This report showed a peak wartime production
of approximately 9,600,000 tons of steel ingots
in the Japanese Empire in 1943. By 1945 Japan’s
steel industry was producing at the rate of only
120,000 tons a year. The report indicated that
1,800,000 tons of the annual capacity was
erased by bombing. The remaining 7,680,000-ton
loss in production was the result of naval
blockades.
Another part of this report showed further
evidence of how naval blockades helped break
down Japan’s economy. In 1941 a total of
4,000,000 tons of iron ore was required by
the Japanese steel industry. Of this, some
3,000,000 tons had to be imported from the
Asiatic mainland and from the Philippines.
As the naval blockade tightened, imports dropped
off; by 1944 the iron content of imported ore was
less than 30 percent of the tonnage imported in
1941.
In common with those of other nations,
Japan’s sea and air fleets were entirely dependent
on petroleum for fuel. Japan imported nearly all
of its petroleum supply. When the blockade
applied by American submarines cut this vital
supply line in 1944, Japanese naval and air forces
were doomed to eventual paralysis. The industrial
deterioration induced in Japan by the blockade
was somewhat slower to take effect, but it was
equally fatal to the nation’s war effort. Industrial
potential is essential in developing sea power;
therefore, the destruction of an enemy’s industrial
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